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OPINION 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Ronald Ross appeals a grant of summary judgment by 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania to Continental Tire of Americas LLC 
(“Continental”) and Kevin Gilhuly in this Family and 
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) action.  29 U.S.C. §2601 et 
seq.  Because Ross received all to which he was entitled 
under the FMLA, and suffered no adverse employment 
consequences for doing so, we will affirm.  
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I. BACKGROUND1 
 
Ross joined Continental, a tire manufacturing company 
headquartered in Fort Mill, South Carolina, as a Car Dealer 
Business Development Manager in February 2008.  In 2010, 
he became an Area Dealer Manager (“ADM”) and then, in 
February 2011, an Area District Manager-3 (“ADM3”).2  As 
an ADM3, Ross began reporting directly to Kevin Gilhuly, a 
Regional Manager.  Given the new responsibilities of his job 
and the fact that much of his work would put him on the road, 
Ross began working out of his home in Philadelphia, 
independently setting his travel schedule and work priorities.  
Ross’s contact with Gilhuly consisted of biweekly regional 
sales conference calls, during which Gilhuly would review 
Ross’s schedule and recommend changes as needed, and 
regular email and phone contact, with “a minimum of two to 
three [interactions] a week.”  (App. at 172 (Ross Dep.).)  Ross 
concedes that, during the entire time of his employment with 
Continental, he had no contract of employment and remained 
an “at will” employee.  (Id. at 164.)   
 
During his tenure at Continental, Ross had questions 
regarding “program specifics in terms of qualification 
requirements for the customer,” “[program] calculations, 
[and] the relationships that [he] was developing, attempting to 
develop, with the customers to help them achieve their sales 
figures.”  (Id. at 171.)  He sought Gilhuly’s “assistance 
                                              
 1 In accordance with our standard of review, see infra 
note 9, we set forth the facts in the light most favorable to 
Ross, the non-moving party.   
 
 2 Ross’s various job titles are as listed in his brief. 
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related to strategies, support, open discussion [sic], about how 
to achieve those on a regular basis,” and he testified that 
Gilhuly was generally available to him.  (Id.)   
 
 One of the customers for whom Ross was responsible 
was Reliable Tire Company (“Reliable Tire”).  Ross testified 
that the Reliable Tire account “required a lot of interaction” 
with Reliable Tire’s owner, Richard Betz, and was a rather 
“large account.”  (Id. at 185.)  In fact, Reliable Tire provided 
Continental with millions of dollars in revenue in 2011 and 
2012.     
 
Shortly after Ross took over as ADM in 2010, Gilhuly 
began receiving negative comments from Betz regarding 
Ross’s performance.  While it is unclear from the record 
exactly when Betz shared his views about Ross, Gilhuly 
testified that Betz “specifically asked” that Ross be removed 
from the Reliable Tire account (App. at 331 (Gilhuly Dep.)), 
since, according to Betz, Ross “wasn’t providing any value to 
him and … was actually a detriment to his business” (id. at 
350).  Betz later testified that he would characterize his 
statements regarding Ross as “comment[s],” not 
“complaint[s],” but he confirmed that he told Gilhuly that 
Ross “doesn’t understand [the] business.”  (App. at 372 (Betz 
Dep.).)  Betz also testified that he was “upset” with Ross 
because Ross had sent one of Betz’s customers to another tire 
distributor.  Betz further acknowledged that he asked that 
Ross be taken off of Reliable Tire’s account.     
 
According to Gilhuly, his concerns about Ross were 
confirmed when he “witness[ed Ross’s] presentations at some 
of the regional meetings that [Continental] had as a sales 
team.”  (App. at 332 (Gilhuly Dep.).)  For example, after 
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Ross gave a regional presentation in February or March of 
2011, Gilhuly spoke with him regarding some of the data that 
Ross had presented and his presentation skills.  Gilhuly also 
was not impressed with Ross’s performance at a meeting to 
which Gilhuly accompanied Ross in June 2011 at Reliable 
Tire. 
 
Sometime during the summer of 2011, Gilhuly began 
reporting Ross’s performance deficiencies to Gabrielle 
Alexander, who worked in Continental’s Human Resources 
Department (“HR”).  As a part of a formal meeting in August 
2011 at which Gilhuly reviewed all of his team members’ 
performance levels and potential, Gilhuly told Alexander that 
Ross was “not meeting expectations.”  (App. at 446 
(Performance Chart).)  In addition, Gilhuly testified that they 
discussed Ross’s ongoing problems working with Betz and 
his poor performance at both the February/March regional 
presentation and the June Reliable Tire meeting.     
 
Later, between September 6, 2011, and October 11, 
2011, Gilhuly corresponded with Alexander and Amanda 
Powell, another HR team member, regarding the development 
of a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”) for Ross, which 
Gilhuly began drafting.3   
                                              
3 Pursuant to Continental’s Performance Management 
Policy, Section V.D.:  
 
Persistent unsatisfactory performance as 
evidenced by a “does not meet expectations” 
performance rating is to be documented and a 
Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) prepared 
by the manager and reviewed with the Human 
 6 
 
On September 21, 2011, Gilhuly told Ross “that a PIP 
was in process.”   (App. at 461 (Email Within Continental).)  
On the evening of October 11, 2011, when both Gilhuly and 
Ross were visiting Continental’s headquarters as a part of a 
national sales meeting, Gilhuly took Ross aside and informed 
him that they would be meeting with HR the next day to 
review a PIP.  Gilhuly suggested that the two of them meet in 
the hotel lobby in the morning, prior to going to the corporate 
office, to discuss the PIP and allow Gilhuly to formally 
provide Ross with his annual review.      
 
That same evening, Ross prepared a memorandum 
outlining a six-month plan of action that acknowledged his 
deficiencies and listed ways he could improve his 
performance.  In the first paragraph, Ross thanked Gilhuly for 
the opportunity to discuss his progress and stated that he was 
                                                                                                     
Resource Manager for that department prior to 
facilitation to the employee.  The PIP will clarify 
for the employee the actions he/she will need to 
take to bring performance to satisfactory levels. 
When satisfactory performance is reached, 
another performance review or written notice 
indicating other than “unsatisfactory” 
performance should be completed. ... An 
employee whose performance continues to 
appear to be “unsatisfactory” should normally be 
removed from the position.  The evaluation 
period may be extended with the approval of the 
manager and Human Resources.  
 
(App. at 465 (Performance Management Policy ).)    
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“very confident” that he could meet or exceed “the 
expectations in the areas [he and Gilhuly had] verbally 
discussed in the last 90 days.”  (App. at 473 (Ross Memo).)   
 
At Ross’s annual review the next morning, Gilhuly 
specified areas for improvement, including program 
understanding, analytical skills, call preparation,  frequency 
of meetings with key customers, financial analysis, 
communication skills during sales calls, and better 
preparation, all of which were documented on an “Employee 
Dialogue Form.”  On that Form, Ross was rated for vision, 
entrepreneurship, execution, drive, learning, and interaction.  
On a scale of 1 to 5 – with 1 being “Minimum Standard not 
Achieved,” 2 being “Developmental Needs,” and 5 being 
“Extraordinary Strengths” – Ross was rated a 1 or 2 nineteen 
times out of a total of thirty-two areas.  (App. at 482 
(Employee Dialogue Form).)  His overall performance 
evaluation was “does not meet expectations.”   (Id. at 483.) 
 
After Gilhuly reviewed his concerns with Ross, the 
two met with Powell in Continental’s corporate offices to 
review the PIP.  The PIP included a memorandum from 
Gilhuly, entitled “ADM3 Performance,” summarizing areas 
of deficiency and setting forth specific guidelines to address 
the identified problems.  The memorandum and Continental’s 
Performance Management Policy reflect that Ross’s 
performance under the PIP was supposed to be evaluated after 
90 days, with the possibility of additional evaluations.  In 
fact, the memorandum included with the PIP specified that 
“[f]ailure to meet each one of these guidelines on an ongoing 
basis will result in further disciplinary action up to and 
including termination.”  (App. at 193 (Ross Dep.).)  While the 
memorandum did say that Ross’s “progress against these 
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expectations” would be “discuss[ed]” every “30 days for 90 
days from the day of issuance,” it did not say that the PIP 
would include any written or in-person performance 
evaluations.  (Id.)  Nor did it specify an end-date, noting that 
Continental would review Ross’s job performance 90 days 
from the PIP’s issuance and then decide “what additional 
actions, if any, will be necessary.”  (Id.)    
 
On November 6, 2011, less than a month after the PIP 
was implemented, Ross forwarded to Gilhuly and Powell a 
letter from his physician to inform them that he had been 
diagnosed with prostate cancer and that further testing and a 
treatment plan would be forthcoming.  Gilhuly promptly sent 
an email to Ross saying, “My thoughts and prayers are with 
you in what must be a very difficult time for you and your 
family.  Take whatever time you need this week for the 
testing to determine the severity of the diagnosis.”  (App. at 
489 (Email Within Continental).)  Despite his illness, 
however, Ross wanted to move forward with his PIP.  In late 
November, he and Gilhuly exchanged emails regarding 
Ross’s request for “direct feedback verbal or written [sic] 
regarding [Gilhuly’s] view” of Ross’s progress and whether 
Ross was “on track.”  (Id. at 492.)  In response, Gilhuly asked 
Ross to schedule a meeting with a customer so that Gilhuly 
could attend and provide feedback.   
 
On December 5, Alexander sent an email to Ross, 
Gilhuly, Powell, Chris Charity (Gilhuly’s superior), and 
James Sicking (Charity’s superior) confirming that “the 
company would do everything we can to support [Ross] 
during this time.”   (Id. at 501.)  Alexander further stated that, 
“based on [Ross’s] health and treatment plan[,] the PIP 
timetable may need to be adjusted.”  (Id.)  Gilhuly answered 
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with an email only to Alexander, Powell, Charity and 
Sicking, explaining that he thought Ross had “definitely made 
progress on most of the areas identified in the PIP,” but that 
“there is still work to be done.”  (Id.)  Specifically, Gilhuly 
made clear that the extension of the PIP would “give [Ross] 
more time to deal with the health issues.”  (Id.)  Sicking also 
testified that Continental put the PIP on “hold” in order to 
give Ross time to “take care of [his] health,” but that the 
intention was to “resume” the PIP once Ross returned.  (App. 
at 293 (Sicking Dep.).) 
 
Later in December, after receiving a formal 
notification of Ross’s treatment plans, Gilhuly sent an email 
to Sicking and Charity, notifying them that Ross would 
require surgery and asking whether “we should consider 
pushing the PIP timetable by at least 30 days.”4  (App. at 503 
(Email Within Continental).)  Gilhuly then forwarded that 
email to Alexander, who agreed that the PIP timetable should 
be extended.  Rather than “end” on January 10th – eight days 
before Ross’s surgery date – the PIP was thus extended to 
February 10, 2012.   
 
Ross, however, did not want the PIP to “hang[] over 
his head” during his recovery.  (Id. at 502.)   He emailed 
Gilhuly on December 23, 2011, asking that the PIP be 
completed by January 12, 2011.  According to Ross, no action 
was taken in response to that request.  Ross admitted at his 
deposition that, “[i]n order to successfully complete [the] PIP, 
                                              
4 Ross told Gilhuly by email on December 22, 2011, 
that his prostate surgery was scheduled for January 18, 2012, 
and that he would need to take 4 to 6 weeks of leave for 
recovery.     
 10 
 
as per the policy, ... management would need to determine 
that [Ross’s] performance was meeting their expectations in 
all areas identified in the PIP.”  (App. at 208 (Ross Dep.).)  
 
It is undisputed that Ross requested and was granted 
FMLA leave that began on the date of his surgery, January 
18, 2012, and ended when he returned to work on March 19, 
2012.  It is also undisputed that he continued to receive his 
regular compensation and insurance benefits while on leave.  
During the time that Ross was on leave, his PIP remained, as 
Ross testified, “pending.”5  (Id. at 209.)   Ross also testified 
that when he finally returned to work on March 19, 2012, the 
status of his PIP was yet “to be determined” but that he 
returned to the same job from which he left.  (Id. at 211.)    
 
On April 12, 2012, almost a month after Ross returned 
from leave, Gilhuly sent him a new memorandum, entitled 
“ADM3 Performance – Addendum to October 12, 2011 
                                              
 5 Twice while on leave, February 17 and February 23, 
Ross emailed Gilhuly regarding his PIP status.  On 
February 23, Gilhuly responded, saying that “[t]he PIP cannot 
be changed or addressed until you return to work full time.”  
(App. at 500 (Email Within Continental).)  Around that same 
time, Ross and Gilhuly spoke on the phone regarding Ross 
returning to work under a “limited-duty basis.”  (App. at 209 
(Ross’s Dep.).)  Given that the majority of Ross’s work 
involved driving and visiting customers, which Ross would 
be unable to do, Gilhuly recommended that Ross not return 
until he received medical approval to engage in full-time 
work.     
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PIAP” (“Addendum”).6   (App. at 506.)  In it, Gilhuly stated 
that he “acknowledg[ed] that progress has been made in 
[Ross’s] job performance since the October 12, 2011 PIAP,” 
but he went on to say, “it is also expected that [Ross] can 
demonstrate that [he] fully understand[s] and can effectively 
communicate to customers all the new 2012 Programs” that 
were introduced while Ross was on leave.  (App. at 506.)  
Gilhuly extended the PIP an additional 60 days from the date 
of the Addendum and instructed that he would then “conduct 
a complete review of [Ross’s] job performance, including the 
new requirements laid out in this addendum[,] and determine 
what additional actions, if any, are necessary.”  (Id.)   
 
On May 14, 2012, Ross filed this lawsuit against 
Gilhuly and Continental, alleging interference with his FMLA 
rights and also alleging retaliation.  On July 19, 2012, while 
this action was pending, Gilhuly sent Ross a third 
memorandum, entitled “ADM 3 Performance – October 12, 
2011 PIAP and April 12th PIAP Addendum” (the “Final 
Memorandum”) that summarized Ross’s performance since 
the initiation of the PIP.  (Id. at 508.)  The thrust of the Final 
Memorandum was that Ross was still not meeting 
Continental’s expectations for his position.  Citing various 
examples – including email chains between Ross and Gilhuly 
and anecdotes of Ross’s work – Gilhuly explained over 
twelve pages that Ross was not “a ‘good fit’ for a sales role, 
particularly one requiring the business acumen to understand 
and effectively communicate [a] complex program.”  (Id. at 
519.)   That same day, Continental terminated Ross’s 
employment in a teleconference with his attorney.  The 
                                              
 6 “PIAP” stands for Performance Improvement Action 
Plan and is synonymous, in the parties’ usage, with “PIP.” 
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decision to terminate Ross was made by Sicking, Gilhuly, and 
Alexander, along with more senior members of Continental.  
Following his firing, Ross amended his complaint to add a 
wrongful-discharge claim.    
 
On October 17, 2012, the District Court dismissed 
Ross’s wrongful-discharge claim.7  The remaining claims 
were an FMLA interference claim against Gilhuly and FMLA 
retaliation claims against both Gilhuly and Continental.8  On 
summary judgment, the Court resolved those claims in favor 
of Gilhuly and Continental.  
 
Ross timely appealed.  
                                              
 7 Ross does not appeal the dismissal of that claim.   
 
 8 At Argument, Ross’s counsel asserted that the 
interference claim is against both Gilhuly and Continental 
(Oral Arg. Tr. at 4:20-21), but no fair reading of the 
Complaint can support that assertion.  Not only does the 
Complaint list Gilhuly as the target of the interference claim, 
but Ross’s Brief makes clear that that targeting was intended.   
(Appellant’s Br. at 5 (“Appellant established a prima facie 
case for FMLA interference against his supervisor in the court 
below[ and] a causal link that could have led a reasonable fact 
finder to conclude that he was retaliated against for taking 
FMLA leave by Continental and his supervisor.”).)  We thus 
reject the effort to amend the Complaint on appeal.    
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II. DISCUSSION9 
 
The only issue before us on appeal is whether the 
District Court erred in granting summary judgment against 
Ross on his FMLA claims.  The FMLA provides, in relevant 
part, that eligible employees are entitled to 12 workweeks of 
leave during any 12-month period due to an employee’s own 
serious health condition.  29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).  When an 
employee returns from FMLA leave, the employer must 
restore the employee to the same or equivalent position he 
held, with equivalent benefits and with conditions of 
employment comparable to those he had when he left.  Id. 
§ 2614(a).  
 
In Lichtenstein v. University of Pittsburgh Medical 
Center, we stated that,  
                                              
 9 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  We review the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment de novo and “view inferences to be drawn from the 
underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party.”  Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243, 248 (3d Cir. 
2010).  “Summary judgment is appropriate where the [c]ourt 
is satisfied ‘that there is no genuine [dispute] as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.’”  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
330 (1986).  A genuine dispute exists only “if the evidence is 
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 248 (1986). 
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[w]hen employees invoke rights granted under 
the FMLA, employers may not “interfere with, 
restrain, or deny the exercise of or attempt to 
exercise” these rights.  Nor may employers 
“discharge or in any other manner discriminate 
against any individual for opposing any practice 
made unlawful.”  The former provision is 
generally, if imperfectly, referred to as 
“interference” whereas the latter is often referred 
to as “retaliation.” 
 
691 F.3d 294, 301 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted).  
We have also held that “an individual supervisor working for 
an employer may be liable as an employer under the FMLA.”  
Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 
408, 415 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 
Ross argues that there are genuine issues of material 
fact that bar the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.  
He says that his rights were violated by Gilhuly failing to 
conclude the initial PIP by January 2012, before he was 
expected to start his FMLA leave, and then by Gilhuly adding 
the PIP Addendum upon his return to work.  He argues that 
he established a prima facie case of interference by Gilhuly 
and that there exists a causal link that could have led a 
reasonable factfinder to conclude that he was retaliated 
against for taking FMLA leave.  
 
A.   Interference 
 
To make a claim of interference under the FMLA, a 
plaintiff must establish: 
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(1) he or she was an eligible employee under 
the FMLA; (2) the defendant was an employer 
subject to the FMLA’s requirements; (3) the 
plaintiff was entitled to FMLA leave; (4) the 
plaintiff gave notice to the defendant of his or 
her intention to take FMLA leave; and (5) the 
plaintiff was denied benefits to which he or she 
was entitled under the FMLA.  
 
Johnson v. Cmty. Coll. of Allegheny Cnty., 566 F. Supp. 2d 
405, 446 (W.D. Pa. 2008); see also Sommer v. The Vanguard 
Grp., 461 F.3d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that an 
interference claim requires an employee to show that he was 
not only entitled to FMLA benefits but that he was denied 
those benefits).  Under an interference claim, “the employee 
need not show that he was treated differently than others[, 
and] the employer cannot justify its actions by establishing a 
legitimate business purpose for its decision.”  Sommer, 461 
F.3d at 399 (3d Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Also, “[b]ecause the FMLA 
[interference claim] is not about discrimination, a McDonnell-
Douglas burden-shifting analysis is not required.”  Id. 
 
As noted previously, Ross brought his interference 
claim only against Gilhuly.  On appeal, there is no dispute 
that Ross met the first, third, and fourth prongs for an 
interference claim, namely that he was an eligible employee 
under FMLA, that he was entitled to FLMA leave, and that he 
gave notice of his intention to take FMLA leave.   The parties 
only dispute whether Gilhuly was liable as an “employer” 
under the FMLA (the third prong) and whether Ross showed 
that he had been denied benefits to which he was entitled 
under FMLA (the fifth prong).  Because Ross received all of 
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the benefits to which he was entitled by taking leave and then 
being reinstated to the same position from which he left, and 
thus cannot satisfy the fifth prong of the interference analysis, 
he fails to make a prima facie showing of interference, and 
we need not address whether Gilhuly was an “employer” 
under the FMLA.   
 
Although Ross argues that his termination and the 
Addendum to his PIP – actions which were taken after his 
FMLA leave – amount to a denial of FMLA benefits, 10 we 
have made it plain that, for an interference claim to be viable, 
the plaintiff must show that FMLA benefits were actually 
withheld.  Callison v. City of Phila., 430 F.3d 117, 119 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (“In order to assert a claim of deprivation of 
entitlements, the employee only needs to show that he was 
entitled to benefits under the FMLA and that he was denied 
them.”).  Ross’s argument that Gilhuly interfered with his 
entitlement to take FMLA leave free from later discrimination 
confuses interference with retaliation and is thus misdirected.  
At bottom, “[a]n interference action is not about 
discrimination[;] it is only about whether the employer 
provided the employee with the entitlements guaranteed by 
the FMLA.”  Callison, 430 F.3d at 120.  Therefore, because 
Ross does not allege that Gilhuly withheld any entitlement 
guaranteed by FMLA, he fails to state a claim for 
interference.11 
                                              
 10 Ross does not argue that he was denied 
reinstatement into the position that he left.  
 
 11 In an April 17, 2014, letter filed pursuant to Rule 28j 
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Ross recasts his 
interference claim to assert that he had somehow been 
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 B.   Retaliation 
 
To succeed on an FMLA retaliation claim, a plaintiff 
must show that “(1) []he invoked h[is] right to FMLA-
qualifying leave, (2) []he suffered an adverse employment 
decision, and (3) the adverse action was causally related to 
h[is] invocation of rights.”  Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 302.   
 
Gilhuly and Continental concede for the purposes of 
this appeal that Ross satisfies the first two elements of an 
FMLA retaliation claim, but they dispute whether Ross 
submitted sufficient evidence to raise a genuine dispute of 
material fact as to whether the Addendum and his termination 
were causally related to the invocation of his FMLA rights.  
Although Ross argues that “it is still somewhat unclear 
whether [this Court] has definitely adopted” the McDonnell 
Douglas framework for an FMLA claim (Appellant’s Br. at 
25), there should not be any such confusion.  With respect to 
                                                                                                     
discouraged from taking FMLA leave.  In addition to Ross 
having waived that argument by failing to advance it in 
briefing, see Ethypharm S.A. France v. Abbott Labs., 707 
F.3d 223, 231 n.13 (3d Cir. 2013) (“We have consistently 
held that ‘[a]n issue is waived unless a party raises it in its 
opening brief, and for those purposes a passing reference to 
an issue ... will not suffice to bring that issue before this 
court.’”), the argument has no basis in fact.  There is simply 
no evidence that Ross was discouraged from taking FMLA 
leave; on the contrary, Continental and Gilhuly fully 
supported Ross’s need for leave and Ross took more than 
eight weeks of FMLA leave, without any interference or 
discouragement from Continental or Gilhuly.   
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retaliation claims based on circumstantial evidence, we have 
stated:  
 
Because FMLA retaliation claims require proof 
of the employer’s retaliatory intent, courts have 
assessed these claims through the lens of 
employment discrimination law. Accordingly, 
claims based on circumstantial evidence have 
been assessed under the burden-shifting 
framework established in McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), while 
claims based on direct evidence have been 
assessed under the mixed-motive framework set 
forth in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228, 276–77 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 
Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 302.  While we decided to “leave for 
another day our resolution of whether the FMLA continues to 
allow mixed-motive claims in the wake of Gross [v. FBL 
Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009)],” id., Ross 
does not argue that his retaliation claims are mixed-motive 
claims.12  The only question, therefore, is whether Ross is 
able to meet the shifting burdens of McDonnell Douglas.   
                                              
 12 In Gross, the Supreme Court held that a mixed-
motive jury instruction is “never proper in an [Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967] claim.”  557 
U.S. at 170.  Since the plaintiff in Lichtenstein “readily 
survive[d] summary judgment under the more taxing 
McDonnell Douglas standard,” we did not find it necessary to 
address whether a mixed-motive framework was appropriate 
to apply to an FMLA retaliation claim.   
691 F.3d at 302. 
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Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff 
must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination.  
Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d 
Cir. 1997).  If the plaintiff succeeds, the defendant must 
articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the 
adverse employment action.  Id.  The burden then shifts back 
to the plaintiff to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that the articulated reason was a mere pretext for 
discrimination.  Id.  Even assuming, arguendo, that Ross 
established a prima facie case, Continental and Gilhuly have 
submitted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Ross’s 
termination – his demonstrably poor job performance – and 
Ross has not adduced any meaningful evidence to allow a 
reasonable factfinder to find pretext. 
 
In urging that he has shown pretext, Ross makes two 
primary arguments.  First, he contends that the sole 
motivating factor for the PIP was Betz’s desire that Ross be 
removed from the Reliable Tire account and not Ross’s 
overall poor performance.  In other words, at least according 
to Ross, there was no assertion that he was failing to meet the 
primary objectives of his position.  But, even if Ross’s 
version of events were accurate, his argument misses the 
point.  Assuming that the PIP was originally justified only on 
the basis of Betz’s concerns does not help Ross because 
customer feedback, particularly from an important customer 
who accounts for millions of dollars of revenue, is an 
obviously valid factor in evaluating performance.13   Ross’s 
                                                                                                     
  
 13 Moreover, a “plaintiff cannot simply show that the 
employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken” to prove 
pretext; rather, the “plaintiff must demonstrate such 
 20 
 
argument is also flawed because its factual premise is belied 
by the record.  Betz’s concerns were not the sole justification 
provided for implementing the PIP or the later Addendum, 
and they were not the sole reason Ross was ultimately 
terminated.  He had admitted to his sub-par performance in 
the memorandum he prepared for Gilhuly the evening before 
the PIP was introduced, and his other numerous failures were 
documented in detail and at length in Gilhuly’s Final 
Memorandum.   
 
Second, Ross contends that pretext is apparent because 
of the temporal proximity between his asking for FMLA 
leave and Continental’s decision to extend the PIP.  He 
asserts that because Continental managers did not begin to 
discuss extending the PIP until after being informed of his 
illness and his intent to take leave, any justification 
Continental now puts forward is pretextual.  Under our 
precedent, however, “the timing of the alleged retaliatory 
action must be unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive 
before a causal link will be inferred.”  Williams v. Phila. 
                                                                                                     
‘weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherences, 
or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate 
reason for its action that a reasonable factfinder could 
rationally find them unworthy of credence, and hence infer 
that the employer did not act for [the asserted] non-
discriminatory reasons.’”  Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. 
Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 331 (3d Cir. 1995) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994)).  
Here, there is no evidence of such weaknesses in the 
explanations proffered by Continental and Gilhuly.  
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Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 760 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, there is nothing 
unusually suggestive about the timing of the Addendum or 
Ross’s termination.  Rather, it was perfectly sensible for 
Continental to delay the timeline of the PIP to accommodate 
Ross’s FMLA leave.  The fact that Ross was placed on the 
original PIP based on documented performance problems 
well before his employer knew he was sick defeats any 
retaliatory inference based on timing.  
 
Again, the reasons for Ross’s termination, as detailed 
in the Final Memorandum, were deficiencies that had existed 
since before he took his FMLA leave.  An employee cannot 
easily establish a causal connection between his protected 
activity and the alleged retaliation when he has received 
significant negative evaluations before engaging in the 
protected activity.  See Shaner v. Synthes, 204 F.3d 494, 504-
05 (3d. Cir. 2000) (“In short, the record shows that Shaner’s 
performance evaluations contained similar criticisms both 
before and after he made the company aware that he suffered 
from MS and before and after he filed his first EEOC charge.  
Under these circumstances, there is simply no evidence that 
any of these evaluations was causally linked to the filing of 
Shaner’s first EEOC charge or that any of them was 
motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory intent.”).  Ross has 
failed to establish a causal link here, and there was no error in 
granting summary judgment.  
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court.   
